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i. Introduction
By one of those legal coincidences that crop up from time to time, the
successful party in the most recent Supreme Court decision in the field of
distribution' - Continental T. V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 2 - is the parent
organization of the victorious entity', "SABA," in the European Court of
Justice's even more recent foray into this area: Metro SB-Grossmarkte
GmbH v. Commission.4
In the United States, the case has brought happiness to the hearts of the
impassioned advocates of a return to "reason"' in an area they thought
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'This paper will be confined to distribution systems - the systems whereby a manufacturer
gets his goods to the consuming public. Although there is a horizontal element in many
distribution systems, we shall assume that all restraints are vertical in nature for the purposes
of the discussion to follow.
'433 U.S. 36 (1977).
'The Commission decision granting an Article 5(3) exemption to Schwarzwalder-Bau-
Anstalt August Schwer und Sohne GmbH (SABA), a 97.5'-o-owned subsidiary of General
Telephone & Electronics Corp. (N.Y.), was challenged by a disgruntled would-be distributor
before the ECJ. The actual style of the case reads: "The Court of Justice affirmed the
Commission's decision and thereby left intact SABA's proposed distribution system which
excluded the petitioners."
'[19781 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. __, 22 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1 (1978).
'See, e.g., Baker, Vertical Restraints in Times of Change: From White to Schwinn to
Where?, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 537 (1975), Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust
Review-1967, 53 VA. L. REV. 1667 (1967); McLaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions,
Consignments, Suggested Resale Prices and Refusals to Deal, 37 ANTITRUST L.J. 137 (1968);
Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 595 (1968);
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282 (1975); Note,
Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions in the Franchising Industry, 10 COLUM. J.L. &
Soc. PROB. 497 (1974); Note, Territorial and Customer Restrictions: A Trend Toward A
Broader Rule of Reason?, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123 (1971); Note, Territorial Restrictions
and Per Se Rules - A Reevaluation of the Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines, 70 MICH. L. REV. 616
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devoid of it since United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.' was decided a
decade ago. Across the Atlantic the European Court ("ECJ") has upheld
the prior decision of the EEC Commission7 that certain vertical restrictions
are exempt from the EEC competition rules' prohibition' when essential to
specific types of selective distribution systems.
The relationship between the two antitrust systems' case law extends
beyond the identity of litigants recently appearing before their highest tri-
bunals. The Schwinn case, representing a dramatic departure from the rule
laid down in White Motor Co. v. United States,9 was decided shortly after "
the ECJ's decision in Consten v. Commission'' and there has been specula-
tion ever since as to the degree of influence the latter decision had on the
United States Supreme Court's views. By the GTE Sylvania decision,
United States jurisprudence approached the position of EEC antitrust law
in abandoning a blanket proscription against all vertical restraints in favor
of evaluation of the individual restriction(s) in the context of its (their)
application. It is appropriate, then, at this time when American jurispru-
dence is rapidly developing in the wake of "liberation" from Schwinn, to
reflect upon the state of the law in Europe. There is understanding to be
gleaned from the different approaches followed by the two systems.
A. The Effect of the GTE Sylvania Case
As with the case it overruled, Sylvania will spawn a voluminous school of
academic comment. It is worth bearing in mind the actual vertical restric-
tion that was at issue.
(1972). But see Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An
Argument for the Continuing Use of a Partial Per Se Approach, 75 MICH. L. REV. 275 (1976);
Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After Sealy and Schwinn, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1181
(1967).
6388 U.S. 365 (1967).
'Re SABA, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 28) 19 (1976).
'In the early 1960s there was some doubt as to whether Article 85 applied to vertical
restrictions. This issue was brought before the ECJ in L.T.M. v. M.B.U., [1966] E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 337, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 39, and in Consten v. Commission, [1966] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 429, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 357. In the first of those cases the Court said:
To fall under this prohibition an agreement must have been made between undertakings. No
distinction is made in the provision as to whether the parties are placed at the same level
(so-called "horizontal" agreements) or at different levels (so-called "vertical" agreements)
of the economic process. Therefore, a contract containing a clause "granting an exclusive
right of sale" may fulfill this condition.
L.T.M. v. M.B.U., 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 357, 374.
And in Consten the Court stated:
In addition, it is pointless to compare on the one hand the situation under Article 85 of a
producer bound by a sole agency agreement to the distributor of his products and on the
other hand that of a producer who includes within his undertaking the distribution of his
products by some means, e.g. by commercial travellers, and who thus escapes Article 85.
5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. (1966).
'372 U.S. 253 (1963).
'The Schwinn case was decided almost exactly one year after Consten (June 15, 1967,
compared with July 13, 1966).
''[19661 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 429, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 357.
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Sylvania manufactured television sets and distributed them to franchised
retailers." The number of franchises was limited for any given area, but
Sylvania reserved the right to increase that number depending on the success
(or failure) of existing retailers to exploit their respective markets. Sylvania
required franchisees to sell Sylvania products only from the location(s) for
which they were licensed. The Court focused upon whether that location
provision violated section I of the Sherman Act.
Faced with territorial and customer restraints in Schwinn 3 the Court had
announced a per se rule of illegality for all vertical restrictions in sales
transactions: "Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for
a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom
an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted dominion with
it."" Conversely, the rule of reason was to govern when "the manufacturer
retains title, dominion and risk with respect to the product and the position
and function of the dealer in question are, in fact, undistinguishable from
those of an agent or salesman of the manufacturer.""
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Sylvania, concluded that the
holding of Schwinn was broad enough to cover the location clause used by
Sylvania. Unlike the Court of Appeals,' 6 he declined to distinguish the case
from Schwinn and chose instead to reevaluate the Schwinn holding in the
light of the standard for the application of per se rules articulated in North-
ern Pacific Railway v. United States:'7 "[Tihere are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack
"Sylvania's market share was 1-2% of national television sales at the time the distribution
system at issue was adopted. By comparison, there were approximately 100 such manufactur-
ers in the industry, with the largest of them, RCA, controlling 60-70% of the market. Con-
tinental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1966) (Part I).
"The restrictions at issue in Schwinn were part of a three-tier distribution system compris-
ing, in addition to Arnold, Schwinn & Co. (Schwinn), 22 intermediate distributors and a
network of franchised retailers. Each distributor had a defined geographic area in which it had
the exclusive right to supply franchised retailers. Sales to the public were made only through
franchised retailers, who were authorized to sell Schwinn bicycles only from specified loca-
tions. In support of this limitation, Schwinn prohibited both distributors and retailers from
selling Schwinn bicycles to nonfranchised retailers.
GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S., at 42.
"388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967).
"Id. at 380.
'On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed by a
divided vote. 537 F.2d 980 (1976). The court acknowledged that there is language in Schwinn
that could be read to support the District Court's instruction but concluded that Schwinn was
distinguishable on several grounds. Contrasting the nature of the restrictions, their competitive
impact, and the market shares of the franchisors in the two cases, the court concluded that
Sylvania's location restriction had less potential for competitive harm than the restrictions
invalidated in Schwinn and thus should be judged under the "rule of reason" rather than the
per se rule stated in Schwinn. The court found support for its position in the policies of the
Sherman Act and in the decisions of other federal courts involving nonprice vertical restric-
tions.
433 U.S., at 41-2.
'356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and . . . illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use."' 8 The Court proceeded to
discourse generally upon the impact of vertical restrictions on interbrand
and intrabrand competition, citing much of the literature critical of the
Schwinn decision. It concluded that, while per se prohibitions under the
formulae of Northern Pacific might be applicable to particular applications
of vertical restrictions, ' 9 the proper standard of evaluation in the absence of
established pernicious economic effect is that stated in Chicago Board of
Trade v. United States:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether ii is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but be-
cause knowledge of the intent may help the court to intepret facts and to predict
consequences."2
But what does the rule of reason tell us about any one particular type of
restraint in any one particular setting? It is difficult enough to analogize
from individual cases to generalized rules when there is substantial case law
to guide one. But between White Motor and Schwinn there were only two
cases before the Court of Appeals which evaluated vertical territorial re-
strictions under the rule of reason.' Courts have less often followed the
dictates of Schwinn than found ways of avoiding its reach, by methods, at
times, straining judicial ingenuity.22
"Id. at 5.
"433 U.S. at 59 (Part Ill). Note, as well, that the Court states in footnote 18 that theperse
illegality of vertical price restrictions is firmly settled.
2246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
"Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-on Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d
825 (7th Cir. 1963).
"For example, the statement in Schwinn that post-sale vertical restrictions or territories are
"unreasonable without more," 388 U.S. at 379, has been interpreted to allow an exception to
the per se rule where the manufacturer proves "more" by showing that the restraints will
protect consumers against injury and the manufacturer against product liability claims. See,
e.g., Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 936-38 (3rd Cir. 1970) (en banc). Similarly, the
statement that Schwinn's enforcement of its restrictions had been "firm and resolute," 388
U.S. at 372, has been relied upon to distinguish cases lacking that element. See, e.g., Janel
Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406 (2d Cir. 1968). Other factual distinc-
tions have been drawn to justify upholding territorial restrictions that would seem to fall within
the scope of the Schwinn perse rule. See, e.g., Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc.,
472 F.2d 637, 639-40 (10th Cir. 1973) (apparent territorial restriction characterized as primary
responsibility clause); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1379-80 (Ct. CI.
1971) (per se rule inapplicable when a purchaser can avoid the restraints by electing to buy the
product at a higher price).
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This paper shall attempt to point out how the EEC judicial system has
coped with the issues raised by vertical restraints. Article 85(1) of the Treaty
of Rome is worded in substantially the same manner as § I of the Sherman
Act and, differences in antitrust philosophy aside, there are close parallels
between the pro- and anti-competitive effects of distribution networks in
each of the two systems. Accordingly, the intent of the analysis will be to
examine, through the medium of American legal concepts and practices, the
competition rules relevant to this field. First, however, one must delineate
the contours of EEC antitrust law.
B. Treaty of Rome Antitrust Law Provisions
Actually, the EEC principles are called "competition rules" and not
"antitrust laws," owing to the difference in time of and motivation for their
creation.2 3 The Treaty provision we are here most concerned with is Article
85, whose first paragraph provides:
The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between member states and which
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-
tion within the common market .... "
Article 85 then continues by providing in its third paragraph for the
exemption from the above prohibition for agreements, decisions and con-
certed practices:
• . . which [contribute] to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share
of the resulting benefit, and which [do] not:
2 EEC competition policy is intended to serve as an instrument to help strike the right
balance between those restrictions on competition which are permissible or even desirable as
a means of creating an enlarged common market and those restrictive practices which
actually impede the integration of markets and should, therefore, be eliminated. As such it
has three basic objectives:
- The first is to help create and maintain a single, common market for the benefit of
business and consumers. Simply removing frontier barriers is not enough if goods and
services are to be traded freely throughout the Community. Rules have to be made and
enforced to ensure that firms do not ... in effect create new barriers that are no less
protective for being invisible.
- The second objective of competition policy is to prevent large companies abusing their
economic power. Here it must make sure that the power to take decisions ... is dispersed
over a large number of independent units to the benefit of the economy as a whole.
- The third objective is to induce firms to rationalise production and distribution and to
keep up with technical and scientific developments. In this way, competition policy can help
to bring about optimum distribution of economic activity within the Community thus mak-
ing Community firms more competitive in the international market place.
COMMISSION OF THE EC, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S COMPETITION POLICY 4 (1976).
141 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2005, at 1631.
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a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable
to the attainment of these objectives;
b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect
of a substantial part of the products in question.2"
Any agreement, decision or concerted practice that is prohibited by Article
85(1) and that is not exempted from that prohibition by Article 85(3) is null
and void.26
Article 87(1) is another Treaty provision of great importance. It imposes
an obligation on the Council of Ministers," acting on a proposal from the
Commission, to adopt the necessary regulations and directives to implement
the principles set out in Article 85. Regulation 17 was enacted pursuant to
this authority, and made provision for existing restrictive agreements,28
defined the powers and competence of the Commission,"' the Court of
Justice,3" and the national authorities,3 and empowered the Commission to
impose fines and periodic penalty payments in order to ensure compliance
with the Treaty rules.3"
Most significantly for our purposes, it established the "negative clear-
ance" procedure, whereby enterprises can obtain a declaration from the
Commission to the effect that their agreement is not prohibited by Article
85(l);"3 established that the Commission is the sole authority vested with the
power to grant an "exemption" - a declaration that the conditions for the
application of Article 85(3) were satisfied;3 ' and required enterprises, in
most instances," to register ("notify" in Community parlance) their agree-
ments with the Commission if they wanted the benefits of either a negative
clearance or an exemption.
The full body of EEC law relating to competition policy includes not only
the Treaty of Rome provisions and Council of Ministers regulations, but
"1d. 2051 at 1661.
" Art. 85(2), 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 2041 at 1657.
"Art. 87(1) provides ". . . the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal of the
Commission ... adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles
set out in Articles 85 and 86." 1 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 2201 at 1699.
2 Council Regulation 17, 5 J.0. COMM. EVR. 204, arts. 5 and 7 (1962).
"Id. arts. 9-16, 24.
"Id. art. 17.
"Id. arts. 10, 13, 23.
"Id. arts. 15, 16, 18.
"Id. art. 2.
"Id. art. 9.
"Id. arts. 4, 5. Article 4(2) makes an exception to the need to notify for certain categories of
agreements. See also Commission Regulation 67/67, 10 J.0. COMM. EUR. 849 (1967); Commis-
sion Regulation 2779/72, 15 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. L 292) 23 (1972).
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also Commission regulations 6 and notices" and case law 8 promulgated by
both the Commission and the ECJ. At various times, all of these have
played a role in delineating the permissible boundaries for distribution
agreements; aside from the cases, of particular relevance to our concerns
are Regulation 67/67,'" which granted a group exemption for certain bilat-
eral exclusive dealing agreements, and two Commission Notices - "On
Agreements of Minor Importance""0 and "On Exclusive Agency Con-
tracts.'"'
11. Per se Rules in the EEC
American antitrust jurisprudence uses the "per se" concept to highlight
common and important anti-competitive situations, to provide certainty in
the law and to lighten the burdens on litigants and on the judicial system.
Conversely, situations where the pro- and anti-competitive effects of an
arrangement are in balance or close to it are not specially identified. Thus,
section 1 of the Sherman Act bars not every agreement restraining trade,
but only those which do so unreasonably.
The question arises whether either concept is known in Community law.
At first glance the rule of reason seems to be embodied (in perhaps more
permissive form) in Article 85(3), which would leave one to assume that
Article 85(1) is applied in a somewhat mechanical manner. While it is true
that the invocation of Article 85(1) is triggered with greater ease than that of
its American counterpart, is it also true that Article 85(1) does not involve
the balancing of pro- and anti competitive impact, leaving this task to
Article 85(3)? Put differently, is there a judicial gloss on Article 85 (1) akin
to the rule of reason? Or are there per se restrictions?
A. The Rule in the L.T.M. v. M.B.U. Case
In one of the earliest and most famous cases, Consten v. Commission of
the EEC, 2 the Commission took the hard line that any agreement by a
"The Treaty of Rome does not grant the Commission the right to make regulations. Its
authority to do so must always stem from a delegation of power from the Council of Ministers
(acting by way of a Council Regulation). See, e.g., Council Reg. 17, art. 24, which empowered
the Commission to adopt Commission Regulation 27, 10 J.O. COMM. EUR. 1118 (1967).
"There is no specific treaty or regulation provision detailing the scope of or authority for
Commission notices. Rather, they are unofficial guidelines issued by the Commission to clarify
its views and to influence the activities of enterprises with regard to certain matters of competi-
tion policy.
"To make a fine distinction, only the Court of Justice decides cases. The Commission
"takes decisions" based upon its investigations pursuant to notifications from firms seeking
negative clearances or exceptions, its own initiatives or complaints from third parties. The
reader may decide the difference this distinction makes.
"10 J.O. COMM. EUR. 849 (1967).
4"5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2921 (1962).
"13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 64) 1 (1970).
'7 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2545, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 489 (1964).
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supplier not to sell to more than one dealer or by a dealer to purchase from
only one supplier was a per se restriction of competition within the meaning
of Article 85(1). The Commission repeated this view in three subsequent
decisions, 3 thus seemingly bringing all exclusive distribution agreements
within its regulatory powers.
However, the ECJ in the L.T.M. v. M.B.U. case" held that exclusive
sales agreements do not automatically come under the prohibition of Article
85, Paragraph 1. Rather, the Court set forth a number of factors to be
appraised in determining the validity of this type of agreement:
... the nature of the products and whether or not their quantity was limited, the
position and importance of the licensor and licensee on the market of the prod-
ucts concerned, whether the contract is isolated or is one of a group of contracts,
and whether the clauses protecting the exclusiveness are rigid or possibilities are
left open for other channels of trade in the same products through re-exports and
parallel imports."
In so ruling, the court recognized that Article 85(1) does not prohibit
certain types of agreements outright; the competent judge or authority must
always examine the effect of the provision under review in the light of the
ascertained economic and legal facts. Of course, this begs the question
whether there are certain practices which although not illegal per se have yet
to and may never find a factual situation justifying their existence. If so,
then the rationale of Northern Pacific would seem equally applicable in
European and American contexts - why waste time and money examining
the anti-competitive impact of certain practices when experience shows that
the number of cases in which it will not be found is so small as not to merit
the constant inquiries? But before turning to answer this question, it is
worth bearing in mind that there already exist two gaps in whatever blanket
proscriptions Article 85(1) contains - the rule in Volk v. Vervaecke4 6 and
the treatment of commercial agents - and an evolving doctrine which has
the potential to alter dramatically the present application of Article 85(1).
B. De Minimis Non Curat Praetor:
The Law Cares Not for Trifles
In Volk v. Vervaecke the ECJ ruled:
... an agreement escapes the prohibition of Article 85 when it only affects the
market insignificantly, account being taken of the weak position held by the
parties on the market in the products in question. It is therefore possible that an
exclusive concession agreement, even with absolute territorial protection, may, in
"Re the Agreement of Establissement Blondel S.A., 8 J.0. COMM. EUR. 2194, 4 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 180 (1965); Re the Agreement of Edmund Isbeque, 8 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2581, 4
COMM. MKT. L.R. 242 (1965); Re the Agreement of Maison Jaccote 9 J.O. COMM. EUR. 37, 5
Comm. Mkt. L.R. DI (1966).
1[1966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 235, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8047.
41ld. CCH 1 8047 at 7696.
46[1969] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 295.
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view of the weak position of the parties on the market in the products in question
in the territory which is subject of the absolute protection escape the prohibition
set out in Article 85(1). 7
The particular case involved the appointment of a sole distributor for
Belgium and Luxembourg (with absolute territorial protection) by a Ger-
man washing-machine manufacturer holding .05 percent of the market for
such products in Germany. By so ruling (and subsequently affirming its
judgment in Cadillon v. Firma Hoss") the Court was evidencing its policy
that negligible anti-competitive effects are not worth the efforts of preven-
tion.
In an attempt to lay down guidelines for the concept's application, the
Commission published its Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance.9
The Notice is essentially an announcement for guidance only and does not
bind either the Commission or the courts. Under its terms, Article 85(1)
does not apply to agreements where the share of the relevant market held by
the products concerned does not exceed five percent and the annual turn-
over of the enterprises concerned does not exceed fifteen million units of
account for manufacturers or twenty million units of account for distribu-
tors."0
The Notice has been criticized for its lack of precision, its limited value in
the light of subsequent decisions and as a further step down a road poorly
chosen by the Court in the case prompting its creation." Nevertheless, its
continued validity has been reaffirmed by the Commission's current prepa-
rations to revise it 2 and the Court of Justice has thus far given no indication
that it is prepared to reverse its views.
Indeed, one can wonder what benefit would accrue from a contrary
holding. Surely the Commission need not be put in the impossible position
of examining every de facto restriction of competition? Recall the com-
ments in Chicago Board of Trade just before the classic rule of reason
definition:
"8 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 273, 282 (1969).
"[19711 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 351, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8135.
"13 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. C 63) I (1970).
"The Commission is currently proposing to increase the annual turnover limit to fifty
million units of account. In its proposal it states that this is necessary to take account of
inflation in the Community between 1970 and 1977 and to broaden the Notice's scope of
application. Commission of the EC, Internal Working Paper on Amendment of the Notice
Concerning Agreements of Minor Importance (1977).
"See Osterweil, Developing EEC Antitrust Law in the Field of Distribution Under Article 85
of the Treaty of Rome, 8 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 77, 81 (1976); Alexander, "Per Se" Rules
Under Article 85 EEC?., in EUROPEAN COMPETITION POLICY 84 (Europa Institute ed. 1973).
"Commission of the EC, Internal Working Paper, note 50 supra. As well as increasing the
turnover threshold, the Commission intends to change the criteria for geographic market share
from "the part of the common market where the agreement produces its effects" to "a
substantial part of the common market," thereby harmonizing the Notice with Regulations
2779/72 and 67/67.
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[T]he legality of an agreement . . cannot be determined by so simple a test, as
whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regula-
tion of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence."
The de minimis rule announced by the European Court of Justice is but
the logical application of the two conditions required for a violation of
Article 85(1) - that the agreement have as its object or effect a restraint on
competition and that the restraint affect trade between the member states.
While in its most recent pronouncement on the subject the Court focused on
the nonfulfillment of the "affect on trade" requirement,"4 it is more accu-
rate to state that an agreement or practice cannot generally prevent, restrict
or distort competition when undertaken by a firm holding an insignificant
position on the market.5"
C. The Status of Commercial Agency
While the concept of commercial agency exists in varying forms in all of
the member states"6 (and is currently the subject of Commission attempts at
harmonization),5" both the European Court of Justice and the Commission
have seen fit to distinguish between agents and "independent traders" for
purposes of Competition Law.58 The significance lies in the fact that the
former are not subject to the requirements of Article 85.
The first attempts to develop a Community definition of or status for
agency occurred on Christmas Eve, 1962, when the Commission issued its
Notice on Exclusive Agency Contracts. 9 This Notice provided a number of
"1246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
"'That condition [affecting trade] is met if the agreement, looked at on the basis of the
whole pattern of objective legal and factual elements, permits one to envisage with a sufficient
degree of probability that it could exercise a direct or indirect, actual or potential influence on
the trade pattern between member-States in a direction which could hinder realisation of the
objectives of a single market between States."
"An exclusive dealing agreement may escape the prohibition of Article 85(1) if, in view of
the weak position of the parties on the market . . . in question . . . it is not capable of
hindering the realization of the objectives of a single market between States. Cadillon,
[19711 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 351, 10 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 420, 429 (1971).
"This statement must be qualified. An agreement which, when viewed in isolation, appears
to be incapable of having more than a minimal impact on competition, may nevertheless be
found to appreciably restrict competition by reason of the cumulative effect of identical or
similar agreements between the parties thereto or between other firms in the same industrial
sector.
See Brasseries de Haecht v. Wilkin-Janssen [1968] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 525; De Norre v.
NV Browern Concordia, 19 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 378 (1977).
"See COMMERCIAL AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS AND RELATED PROBLEMS OF
LICENSING IN THE LAW OF THE EEC (W. VAN GERVEN & F. LUKOFF EDS. 1970).
"COMMISSION OF THE EC, PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL DIRECTIVE TO COORDINATE THE LAWS OF
THE MEMBER STATES RELATING TO (SELF-EMPLOYED) COMMERCIAL AGENTS (Brussels 1977).
"See Consten, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418, 470 (1966); Italy v. EEC Council, 8 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 39, 63 (1969); Re Pittsburgh Corning Europe, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D2 (l973); Re the
European Sugar Cartel: "Suiker Unie" v. Commission, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 295 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Sugar Case].
"5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2921 (1962).
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criteria which could be applied to a given agreement to determine how the
representative appointed under it should be regarded. Of foremost impor-
tance was the presence or absence of economic risk borne by the appointee:
Except for the usual del credere guarantee, a commercial agent must not, by the
nature of his functions, assume risk resulting from the transaction. If he does
assume such risks his function becomes economically akin to that of an indepen-
dent trader and he must therefore be treated as such for the purposes of the rules
of competition."0
Three examples of situations were detailed in which, because financial
risk is present, the representative is more likely to be considered an indepen-
dent trader:
[When he] is required to keep or does in fact keep, as his own property a consider-
able stock of the products covered by the contract, or
• ..is required to organize, maintain or ensure at his own expense a substantial
service to customers free of charge, or does in fact organize, maintain or ensure
such a service, or
...can determine or does in fact determine prices or terms of business."
In Part II of the Notice the Commission expanded upon its view, specify-
ing that where the agent performs a mere auxiliary function to his principal
- acting upon his instructions and in his interests - there is no restriction
on competition within the meaning of Article 85(1). That a distinction must
be drawn between agents acting "as an auxiliary organ forming an integral
part of the principal's undertaking" 6 and independent traders bearing "the
financial risks of the sales or of the performance of contracts entered into
with third parties ' 6 has been affirmed in numerous decisions and cases. 6,
The reasoning underlying the above distinction, however, has been the
subject of some criticism. 65 The Commission itself admitted in its Notice
that the mutual exclusivity usually involved in agency agreements entails a
limitation of demand on the market where the agent operates. It neverthe-
less felt that this restriction was both appropriate and necessary to protect
the respective interests of the agent and principal. A more fundamental
difficulty is that a powerful manufacturer could conceivably utilize a net-
work of agents to eliminate competition at the distribution level or to divide
markets with the same effect as distribution through independent distribu-
tors with exclusive territorial protection.
:'Id. at pt. 1.
I Id
.
62Sugar Case, 17 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 468.6 1d
.
"See cases cited note 58 supra.
"
5See J. MEGRET, J.V. Louis & M. WAELBROECK, 4 LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTE ECONOMI-
QUE EUROPEtNNE 188 (Bruxelles 1972); D. GILSTRA & D. MURPHY, Distribution Systems and
EEC Competition Law, in LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 81, 90-91; Osterweil,
Developing EEC Antitrust Law in the Field of Distribution under Article 85 of the Treaty of
Rome, 8 LAW AND POLICY IN INT'L Bus. 77, 83-84 (1976); Leigh & Guy, Exclusive Agency
Agreements in the EEC, I EUR. L. REV. 282 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Exclusive Agency].
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The Pittsburgh Corning decision66 gave the Commission the opportunity
to deal with this latter problem. In rejecting Pittsburgh Corning's attempts
to characterize its relationship with its Belgian distributor as one of agency
(within the terms of the Notice), the Commission made it clear that it would
accept neither mere appearances nor artificially constructed arrangements,
but would reserve to itself "the right to re-establish the true character of
legal acts, relations between undertakings and economic situations:" 6
It is for the Commission to judge whether a factual situation corresponds with
what it had in mind when it tried, as it said, "to give undertakings indications of
the considerations which would guide it in interpreting Article 85(1)." In fact, the
Commission in that Notice was only referring to contracts concluded with com-
mercial agents proper, in the strict sense, and without prejudice to a thorough
examination of individual cases. "
That it is no simple matter to draw a line between agent and independent
trader has been acknowledged by the ECJ. In the Sugar Cases the Court
concluded that the
mere fact that an agreement establishes a principal-agent relationship does not in
itself suffice to take the agreement in question outside the ambit of Article 85(1),
if in fact the agent carries on other activities outside his agency agreement and
cannot therefore properly be regarded as merely an auxiliary organ forming part
of one economic unit with his principal. 9
In particular, while the Court agreed with the Commission that the exclu-
sive agency agreements in question were, in fact, covered by Article 85(1), it
saw fit to waive the fines which the Commission had imposed in respect of
these agreements because "the possibility that the wording of the said com-
munication could induce the belief that such a practice was accepted as
being compatible with the Treaty cannot . . . be ruled out.""
What is clear from the law in this area is that there is no "bright-line"
rule for distinguishing between agent and independent trader. One pair of
authors has deduced that there are in fact four decisive criteria" in addition
to that of the agent not assuming any economic risk and that the only safe
conclusion is that if all are fulfilled the agreement may be assumed to be
outside the ambit of Article 85(1).
If EEC law in this area is less than crystal-clear, American law is no more
lucid. American jurisprudence at one point applied a rather wooden for-
mula: under the ruling in United States v. General Electric Co.72 vertical
6615 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. L 272) 35, 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D2 (1973).
111d. D6-7.
"Id. D8.
6917 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 295 (1976).
"Id. at 477.
"(1) Integration (of the agent into the sales organization of the principal).
(2) Economic dependence (of the agent on the principal).
(3) Auxiliary function (rendered by the agent to the principal).
(4) Reciprocity of obligation, i.e., the reciprocal undertaking by the agency to work for no
other principal. Exclusive Agency, supra note 64, at 295.2272 U.S. 476 (1926).
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restrictions in a distribution system characterized by a consignment or
agency relationship between the parties did not run foul of the Sherman
Act.73
Simpson v. Union Oil Co.'" laid to rest this triumph of form over sub-
stance. In that case a system in which an oil company sold gasoline on
consignment through retailers, reserving to itself the ability to set the prices,
was found to be a prohibited price-fixing scheme notwithstanding the fact
that most if not all of the indicia of agency or consignment were present.
The Court refused to let legality for antitrust purposes turn on clever drafts-
manship and declared the principle of judicial recasting of an agreement to
determine its true nature.
The problem remaining was lack of certainty in the law - where was the
line to be drawn between what one could and could not do with agents?
Should one look to the intent of the parties, disallowing those systems
where the structure has been conceived solely or mainly to avoid the impact
of the Sherman Act? How could one determine this intent? Should it be
inferred whenever the value of the antitrust "violations" they would immu-
nize would be "substantial" or of greater importance to the firms involved
than the benefits accruing from the use of consignment? How could one
measure and compare those benefits?
But if it is not illegal for an owner of an article to send it to a dealer to be
sold only at a price determined by the owner,"5 intention alone must not be
the relevant criterion. Maybe it is the size and market power of the owner of
the goods, maybe it is the context of the consignment - whether it is
occasional or part of a distribution system.
Without ascertaining the decisive criteria, one can note the parallel be-
tween Simpson v. Union Oil Co. and the Commission decision in Pittsburgh
Corning: The competent tribunal will determine the "true nature" of the
agency, its structure notwithstanding. In both legal systems the stakes will
be high - one either falls within or without the antitrust laws' strictures.
It is necessary to digress a moment and contemplate the Schwinn deci-
sion. As is well known, the Court in that case drew a clear distinction
between consignment and sale, indicating that territorial or customer re-
strictions, although per se illegal once title to goods sold had passed, were to
be analyzed under the rule of reason in regard to non-sale transactions. 6
Two conditions were imposed for a consignment plan to pass muster. First,
the manufacturer must retain title, dominion and risk of loss. Second, the
"Note that General Electric involved patented goods. But see Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377
U.S. 13, 23 (1964): "The Court in the G.E. case did not restrict its ruling to patented articles,
it, indeed, said that the use of the consignment device was available to the owners of articles
'patented or otherwise.'
7"377 U.S. 13 (1964).
731d.
76388 U.S., at 379-80.
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function of the dealer must be such that it is indistinguishable from that of
an agent or salesman of the manufacturer.7" The problem, of course, is
reconciling this holding with Simpson. Thankfully, Sylvania has safely in-
terred Schwinn and one can conclude that the rule of reason governs both
sale and certain (under Simpson) non-sale transactions involving vertical
restrictions.
The difference, then, between the Community and American approach to
agency appears to be that the criteria are more extensively laid out in the
European system. Given the confused state of the law in the EEC, that is
not saying much.
D. A Rule of Reason for Article 85(l)?
Arguably, one could dismiss the above two exceptions to the application
of Article 85(1) as not really relevant to a determination of whether a
"reasonableness" test is evolving in relation to that article. It could be
emphasized that the "de minimis" rule is merely a threshold question -
stating nothing more outlandish than that a company with insignificant
market power cannot generally affect trade between member states nor
appreciably restrain competition no matter what agreements it enters into."
Similarly, the exception for commercial agents can be viewed as a recogni-
tion that a manufacturer should, in the context of distribution, be able to
utilize intermediaries to perform functions akin to those his employees
could undertake. The rationale underlying the agency concept as promul-
gated in the EEC seems to suggest that agents are not covered by Article
85(1) when (and because) they are just like employees.
Both of these "exceptions" could be more accurately termed "parame-
ters" or "boundaries" delimiting what is within the coverage of the Article.
In neither situation is one looking at an agreement between undertakings
and saying "Ah, it significantly restrains competition but let's leave it be -
it is a reasonable restriction in the context of its intended result." By way of
contrast, in the field of "selective distribution" that is precisely the ap-
proach that has evolved in the Commission's jurisprudence.
Selective distribution involves nothing more than a manufacturer select-
ing his distributors (wholesalers) and retail dealers, and imposing certain
requirements upon them. By its very nature it entails a limitation on the
number of entities taking part in the distribution chain; the criteria for
admission to the system being either qualitative or quantitative standards or
a combination of the two.
In its first decision in this area, Kodak, " the Commission declared Article
85(1) inapplicable to the modified uniform conditions of the sale used by
"Id. at 381.
"But see note 55 supra.
'13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 147) 24 (1970).
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the Kodak companies in the Common Market. One clause of those sales
conditions stipulated that Kodak products were supplied on the basis that
"they shall not normally be resold at any stage of subsequent marketing
except by qualified staff and in premises which allow their storage, presen-
tation and sale in satisfactory condition." 80 In the Commission's view this
decision represents the view that a manufacturer may choose his retailers by
setting "objective qualitative standards which must be met by the retailer as
regards his own and his staff's qualifications and training and the nature of
his premises."'" Even though supplies may be withheld from dealers who do
not meet these requirements, such a system is not caught by the prohibition
in Article 85(1), provided that the same objective requirements are imposed
on all potential purchasers and are applied without discrimination.
Notwithstanding the restriction on intra-brand competition which must
result from the exclusion of certain potential entrants to the distribution
chain, the Commission implicitly determines that two factors absolve such a
scheme from an anti-competitive characterization: (i) without such restric-
tions the effectiveness of the distribution system in fulfilling its basic func-
tions would be fatally jeopardized; (ii) the restriction on intra-brand com-
petition is outweighed by the increase in inter-brand competition that results
from strengthening distribution chains for competitive products.
One does not quarrel with the outcome of the decision; however, one
does note that the analysis takes place not in the context of the third, but the
first paragraph of Article 85. The Kodak case (albeit aided by a subsequent
expansive interpretation of its holding by the Commission) marked the
beginning of an analysis under Article 85(1) of whether the restrictions on
competition were "reasonable" in light of the purpose for their application.
The original standard of this reasonableness was very high: restrictions were
justifiable only when without them the whole system of distribution neces-
sary for the product would collapse. While it is perhaps easy to sympathize
with a requirement that a vendor of a piece of technical equipment requiring
expert instructions on use or skilled after-sales servicing be capable of pro-
viding those services, the difficulty lies in the extent to which this concept
has been expanded.
The Omega decision82 came next and in it the Commission authorized as
compatible with Article 85(1) requirements for admission to retail-watch-
merchant status of "adequate professional qualifications (i.e., watchmak-
ers and jewellers) [sic] and well located and turned-out premises." Now,
watches are bits of complex machinery, but retailers were not obliged to
perform repairs. That being so, the qualitative standards of selection appear
to lack any relation to the "needs" of product service other than the
manufacturer's desire to sell through prestige outlets.
"Id.at 25.
"COMMISSION OF THE EC, FIFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 23 (Brussels 1976).
1213 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. L. 242) 22 (1970).
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December 1974 saw the release of two somewhat contradictory decisions,
BMW 3 and Dior/Lancome. " In the former, the Commission appeared
to have reconsidered its previous reasoning. It determined that the obliga-
tions imposed on BMW's retailers to follow BMW's advertising policies,
use BMW trademarks only as authorized, receive BMW's permission before
entering certain trade exhibitions and regularly inform BMW of certain
trading conditions were not violative of Article 85(1)." However, it did
consider as infringements of that article the following qualitative standards
for admission to the BMW distribution system as a retailer:
(a) to operate a business the layout of whose premises, equipment and technical
and commercial management satisfy BMW requirements;
(b) to operate a service department and workshop to BMW's requirements, to
employ properly qualified staff and ensure that they receive the training
required;
(c) to provide after-sales service;
(d) to maintain a stock of goods sufficient to satisfy demand;
(e) to operate a guarantee system (including providing free service under it). 6
One notes that (a) and (b) above bear striking resemblance to the provi-
sions authorized in Omega and Kodak. Furthermore, considering the com-
plex technical nature of automobiles and their need for constant service and
repairs, it would have seemed that the BMW decision afforded the Commis-
sion the opportunity to exclude all of the listed qualitative requirements
from Article 85(1) on the grounds of their indispensability to a viable distri-
bution system for such products. Viewed in isolation, the BMW decision
appears to represent a move away from the expansive trend of Omega.
However, at the same time it decided BMW, the Commission issued its
"press release" concerning the French perfume industry. While not adopt-
ing a formal decision, the Commission stated that there was no need for it
to take action under Article 85(1) in relation to the distribution system
employed by the perfume manufacturers. Notwithstanding the fact that
perfume is a relatively simple product requiring no special skills on the part
of its vendors, the selection of retailers based on both qualitative (a "classy
shop") and quantitative (minimum market size varying with the estimated
wealth of the locale) criteria was approved. One could easily wonder how a
manufacturer's desire to restrict sales of its product to prestige shops solely
in order to promote its luxury image would be justified under Article 85(3)!
Suffice it to say that the approval, under Article 85(1), of the qualitative
standards represents a further expansion of the Kodak doctrine and that the
acceptance of the quantitative limits was a mistake.
1'18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. 19) 5 (1975); [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 9701.
'These two companies were the subjects of a Commission investigation into the French
perfume industry. Rather than make a formal decision, the Commission, satisfied that the
companies had altered their distribution networks to the necessary degree, issued a press
release so indicating.
:,BMW, [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9701, at 9539-9.
61d. 9701, at 9539-7, 8.
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In the SABA decision,8 7 distribution of consumer electronic equipment
was approved under Article 85(1) even though it utilized the following
restrictions:
1. [the requirement that a wholesaler:]
(a) keep a specified shop, i.e., one where over 50 percent of the turnover relates
to the sale of radio, television, tape-recording or other electrical equipment,
or has set up a department specializing in the wholesale of radio, television
and tape-recording equipment with a turnover comparable to that of a whole-
saler specializing in electronic equipment for leisure purposes;
(b) participates in the creation and consolidation of the SABA sales network:
(c) participates in the SABA service system and has in particular a qualified staff
to give proper advice and supply technical service to customers;
(d) signs the SABA Cooperation Agreement [forbidding retail sales] ...
2. [and the requirements that retailers:]
(a) keep a specialized shop, i.e., one where over 50 percent of the turnover relates
to the sale of radio, television, tape-recording or other electrical equipment,
or have set up a department specializing in the sale of radio, television and
tape-recording equipment;
(b) trade from retail premises which are suitable for advertising and displaying
SABA products;
(e) be able, through qualified staff, to give proper advice and service to con-
sumers;
(f) be able to provide customers with technical service and give a guarantee to the
consumer in accordance with the SABA Guarantee .... 1.
Finally, in the most recent decision in the area, Junghans, 11 the following
restrictions on clock and watch retailers were approved:
[that] he possess appropriately qualified full-time staff. Appropriately qualified
staff are defined as persons who have passed examinations prescribed by national
authorities or by appropriate trade associations in the relevant State, or who have
been engaged in the watch and clock trade for at least three years;
[that] the internal fitting and external appearance of the shop are suitable for the
sale of clocks and watches;
[that] clocks and watches are sold either in a specialized department in the case of
a department store or, in the case of a shop, it has its own sales area with display
windows, separated from the proprietor's dwelling;
[that] a representative range of clocks and watches is stocked;
[that] adequate facilities and staff are provided to give specialist service, particu-
larly for repairs;
[that] in the case of department stores, adjacent goods do not adversely affect the
character of the department or its display of clocks and watches."0
It will be appreciated that we have progressed from permitting only those
restrictions indispensably related to the products' characteristics (e.g., ser-
B719 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 28) 19 (1976); [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 9802.
:Vd. 9802, at 9793-13.
"20 O.J. EUR.COMM. (No. L 30) 10 (1977), 11976-1977 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 9912.
'Old. 9912, at 9963-7, 8.
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vice needs) to allowing restrictions based on commercial judgment (e.g., the
type or appearance of the retailer's shop). Given present commercial reali-
ties, it seems fair to say that vendors of products requiring repairs, prepara-
tion or special user knowledge must be able to provide those services. In
such circumstances one can more easily understand the Commission's view
that to exclude from the retail network those who are incapable of or
unwilling to provide these services does not involve a restriction of competi-
tion within the meaning of Article 85(1). But once restrictions beyond those
necessary because of the product's technical nature are included, it is absurd
to suggest that Article 85(1) is not violated. Rather, it is being implicitly
determined that the restrictions are reasonable in light of the product, the
proposed distribution system and the manufacturer's aims.
One could well ask "So what?" This creeping "reasonableness" standard
governs only selective distribution and what has thus far been approved
under Article 85(1) could easily be approved under 85(3). However, what
applies to selective distribution today could apply to other areas of distribu-
tion tomorrow. Although the result in any particular case would be the
same regardless of whether the Commission approved the restraints under
the third or first paragraphs of Article 85, it is not merely a doctrinal point
that is being raised. National courts are empowered to apply Article 85(1),
whereas only the Commission can grant an Article 85(3) exemption. The
result of a reasonableness test being engrafted onto Article 85(1) is that
national courts' power to shape the evolution of competition policy is
greatly enhanced. Furthermore, an exemption absolves one from liability
only from the date of the notification onwards - a finding of reasonable-
ness under Article 85(1) means that there has never been a restriction of
competition. 9 '
One is not presently reassured by the Commission in this area. That the
BMW and "perfume" decisions were released at the same time is puzzling
enough. Comparing the conditions found violative of Article 85(1) in the
BMW decision with those approved under the same article in SABA or
Junghans does not enhance one's opinion of the logic running through the
Commission's decisions in selective distribution cases. It is interesting that
the American company (GTE Sylvania) whose lawsuit resulted in a return
of "reason" to vertical restrictions in the United States is the parent com-
pany of the entity (SABA) that afforded the European Court of Justice the
opportunity to enshrine the Commission's "Article 85(1) rule of reason"
into Community case law.
!11. What "Reason" Rules EEC Competition Law?
A. On the Application of Article 85(3)
It is obvious from the wording of Article 85(3) that a process akin to the
rule of reason is employed by the Commission in determining the legality of
"See Regulation 17, supra note 28, art. 6(1).
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agreements which restrain trade. While the American approach of balanc-
ing pro- and anti-competitive effects is used in the assessment under Article
85(3) (and, as indicated above,92 in the Article 85(1) assessment as well), it is
but one of the relevant factors. It is worthwhile digressing for a moment to
consider three aspects unique to the EEC antitrust system.
First, one must bear in mind that the Commission is the sole authority
empowered to grant an Article 85(3) exemption.93 A national court may
suspend proceedings to allow a party appearing before it to request the
Commission's determination,9" but, in the absence of such a determination,
it must apply the consequences of Article 85(2) to any agreement which it
finds violative of Article 85(1).
Second, the Commission has considerable latitude in its deliberations
pursuant to Article 85(3). This margin of appreciation (or discretion) has
been acknowledged on at least two occasions by the European Court. In the
Consten9" case it was stated that:
... the exercise of the Commission's powers [in regard to Article 85(3)] necessar-
ily implies complex economic judgments. Judicial control of those judgments
should respect that character by limiting itself to an examination of the material-
ity of the facts and legal descriptions which the Commission deduces therefrom.
This control will be carried out in the first place over the reasoning of the deci-
sions which, with regard to the said judgments, should set out the facts and
considerations on which they are based. 6
The Court reaffirmed this view in the recent Metro case.9 7
For its part, the Commission has held that its deliberations under Article
85(3) include not only an appreciation of the competitive impact, but also
public policy considerations. Indeed, where public policy compels it, even a
clearly anti-competitive arrangement can be exempted. In the Metro case the
Court endorsed this approach by its determination that one of the grounds
for exempting a clause in a distribution agreement requiring distributors to
place fixed supply orders six months in advance was the element of stability
regarding the maintenance of employment which such a requirement can
provide. The Court emphasized that this was particularly true in times of a
deteriorating economic environment.9 8
"See Part 11-D supra.
"Regulation 17, art. 4(1).
"This is left to the discretion of the particular national court. However, there would be little
utility in a court proceeding to adjudicate a suit before it on the basis of Art. 85(1) and (2) when
there is a substantial possibility that the condemned agreement would be "exempted" by the
Commission pursuant to Art. 85(3). This follows, of course, from the supremacy of Commu-
nity law over national law. See Costa v. E.N.E.L., [1964] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1141;
[1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161.
115 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 445 (1966).
"Id. at 477.
"[1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep., 22 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, at 45.
"Id. at 43.
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One should note that the criteria for exemption under Article 85(3) are
applied individually and the agreement must pass muster under each one. It
is true that the "non-elimination of competition in respect of a substantial
part of the market for the products in question" is probably the most
important test and that when it and the "sharing of benefits with con-
sumers" criteria are satisfied the Commission will rarely strike down an
agreement. However, it is not correct to suggest that, in similar fashion to
the American approach, when an agreement's overall competitive impact is
positive it will be exempted.
With these points in mind, one can respond to the question left un-
answered above: whether there are quasi per se prohibitions against certain
practices in the EEC legal system.
B. Per Se Rules Revisited
In the previous discussion concerning per se rules,99 it was determined
that, in relation to Article 85(1), they do not now exist in the EEC. In fact, it
was suggested that a rule of reason (a balancing of pro- and anti-
competitive impact) is evolving in relation to that particular treaty provi-
sion. It remains to be seen whether certain practices are proscribed per se. In
this regard, the analysis must take place under Article 85(3) to be meaning-
ful.
Absolute territorial protection, whether directly or indirectly imposed,
provides an excellent frame of reference for testing a per se hypothesis. The
elimination of barriers to the integration of the Common Market is not
simply a goal of Competition Policy, but is close to a fundamental precept
underlying the EEC's existence.'0" If anything is to be prohibited perse, the
fragmentation of the Common Market into exclusive national or regional
territories is the likeliest candidate.
The prohibition against the partitioning of markets without the corrective
possibility of parallel imports was first laid down in the Consten decision. 0'
Grundig, a German manufacturer of radios and television sets, gave the
French company Consten the exclusive right to sell Grundig products in
France. Grundig agreed that it would not deliver merchandise directly or
indirectly to any person in France other than Consten, and it prohibited its
other distributors from exporting into that country. On its part, Consten
agreed that it would not deliver any Grundig products directly or indirectly
outside of France. To reinforce the territorial restrictions, Consten was
authorized to register certain Grundig trademarks. The case arose from a
complaint filed with the Commission by a company being sued by Consten
under the French unfair competition and trademark laws for importing
Grundig products into France.
"See Part II supra.
"'See note 23 supra.
'0r7 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. L161) 2545 (1964); 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 489 (1964).
United States and Common Market Distribution Antitrust Law 67
Following its investigation, the Commission isued a decision in which it
required Consten and Grundig to refrain from any and all measures tending
to impair the freedom of third parties to acquire, from wholesalers or
retailers established in the EEC, the products covered by the contract for
the purpose of reselling them in the contract territory.' 2 On appeal,' 3 the
ECJ substantially affirmed the Commission's position.' 4
Since that decision, the prohibition against absolute territorial protection
has been consistently reiterated.' 0 Regulation 67/67,1°6 which grants a
group exemption to various categories of exclusive dealing arrangements, 07
specifically excludes from its scope of application those agreements which
directly or indirectly involve such restrictions."' Similarly, absolute prohi-
bition of exports outside the EEC has not been found to be an appreciable
restraint of competition affecting trade between Member States solely be-
cause the double imposition of customs duties involved in crossing the
Community frontier twice effectively bars competitive re-importation of the
goods.' 9 This is borne out by recent decisions mandating the removal of
such export bans in relation to countries belonging to the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA), ' ' ° since customs duties between the EEC and
EFTA have been abolished as of July 1, 1977.11
Reliance on rules of municipal law in order to maintain territorial
exclusivity cannot rule out the possibility of the application of Article 85(1).
In Procurer du Roi v. Dassonville'' the ECJ held:
'
21d. 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 489, 504 (1964).
'319661 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418 (1966).
'
04The Commission had voided the entire agreement between Grundig and Consten pursuant
to Articles 85(1) and 85(2) of the Treaty of Rome. The Court of Justice reversed the Commis-
sion on this point because only the specific clauses giving Consten absolute territorial protec-
tion were void. [19661 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, 386.
"'See, e.g., Re The Application of Gerofabriek NV, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) 8
(1977); Wilkes v. Theal, 20 O.J. EUR COMM. (No. L 39) 19 (1977); Community v. Miller
Schallplatter Gmbh, O.J. EUR COMM. (No. L 357) 40 (1976); Re the Agreement between
Europair & Duro-Dyne, 18 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 38) 10 (1975); Re Deutsche Philips Gmbh,
16 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 293) 40 (1973); Re Dupont Gmbh, 16 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L
194) 24 (1973); Re Cimbel, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 303) 52 (1972); Re Pittsburgh Corning
Europe, 15 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. L 272) 35 (1972); Re Omega Watches, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR.
(No. L 242) 22 (1970); Re A.S.P.A., 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 47) 24 (1970).
'Commission Regulation 67/67, 10 J.O. COMM. EUR. 849 (1967), as amended by 15 J.O.
COMM. EUR. (No. L 276) 15 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Reg. 67/671.
"'See § IV B infra.
"''Reg 67/67, art. 3(b).
"'See, e.g., Re the Agreements of Gebruder Junghans GmbH, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
30) 10 (1977); Re SABA, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 28) 19 (1976); Re Kaselmetal's Agree-
ment, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 34 (1975).
"°See, e.g., SABA and Junghans, supra, note 109. The members of EFTA are Austria,
Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, Iceland, Norway and Finland.
.. See, e.g., Association Agreement between the European Economic Community and Swit-
zerland, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 300) 189 (1972). The agreements between the EEC and
individual EFTA members all contain provisions substantially reproducing Treaty of Rome
Articles 85 and 86. See, e.g., the Assoc. Agreement with Switzerland, supra, arts. 23, 27.
"[1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 837.
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An exclusive dealing agreement falls within the prohibition of Article 85 when it
impedes, in law or in fact, the importation of the products in question from other
Member States into the protected territory by persons other than the exclusive
importer.
More particularly, an exclusive dealing agreement [is contrary to Article 851 if
the concessionaire is able to prevent parallel imports from other member states
into the territory covered by the concession by means of the combined effects of
the agreement and a national law requiring the exclusive use of a certain means of
proof of authenticity.' ' 3
The use of industrial property rights for the same ends is likewise prohib-
ited: "The Community's competition system . . . does not permit the use of
rights deriving from one or another national trade mark law to defeat the
effectiveness of the Community law on restrictive practices.""
If an enterprise cannot impose absolute territorial limitations in the form
of contractual provisions preventing imports or exports, it may be tempted
to achieve the same results by indirect means. One method repeatedly at-
tempted and successively struck down involves differential pricing schemes.
The system under review in the Pittsburgh Corning decision' II was such that
the list prices charged to national distributors were subject to substantial
rebates upon proof that the merchandise was sold to and used by consumers
within the assigned territory. The Commission condemned this structure as
an attempt to isolate a national market (Germany) and prevent consumers
from obtaining the products on better terms (German prices being up to
forty percent higher than those in Belgium and the Netherlands).
In the Kodak decision"' the Commission ordered removal of a clause in
the Kodak standard conditions of sale which provided that no matter where
the company selling the goods was located, the purchasers had to pay the
price fixed for the goods by the Kodak subsidiary situated in their country.
Although there was no specific export prohibition, had this clause remained
a customer would never have had any interest in purchasing the goods from
anyone other than the distributor for his country.
Similarly, in the recent Distillers decision'" various allowances, rebates
and discounts given by the manufacturer to its United Kingdom trade custo-
mers were denied when the goods were bought for export to other Member
States. The Distillers Company (DCL) argued that the resulting price dif-
ferential was due solely to artificially low prices in the United Kingdom
(resulting from the "excessive" purchasing power of its trade customers
there) and the need to allow for sales promotion obligations imposed upon
distributors located in countries other than the United Kingdom. The Com-
mission refused to accept either of these arguments as justifications. It
'"'d. at 853. See also Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export S.A., 119711 17 C.J.
Comm. E. Rec. 949.
"'Consten, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 476.
'15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 272) 35 (1972), 12 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D2 (1973).
"'13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 147) 25 (1970), 9 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at D19 (1970).
'21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 50) 16 (1978).
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specifically rejected the sales promotion notion on the basis that the goods
in question (spirits) were not new products in need of introduction for
which extraordinary promotional efforts were required'" and because DCL
could assume the responsibility for promoting sales in the other EEC mar-
kets itself or allow for the promotional costs in the prices charged to the
non-British distributors."
It would appear from the above that both direct and indirect methods of
achieving absolute territorial isolation are incapable of being granted an
Article 85(3) exemption. However, there are instances where each method
has been approved.
In the wake of Schwinn, 2 which struck down direct vertical restrictions,
American jurisprudence developed three permissible ways of indirectly im-
posing territorial limitations.'' The first of these, the "profit passover,"
involves the seller paying a percentage of the gross receipts on sales outside
his area."'2 The profit passover is based on the rationale that the distributor
who actually has the territory will have at least to provide service to the
"pirated" customer in the future, or will have lost something in the form of
goodwill or past investment. However, unless the profit passover is limited
to an amount no more than necessary to reimburse the distributor for his
loss of expenditures for advertising, sales and service efforts and goodwill,
it would effectively bar extraterritorial sales efforts, since the distrihutor
actually making the sale must be reasonably assured of some profit.
It seems quite clear that the Commission would have no difficulty reject-
ing a profit passover system which includes an amount designed to "penal-
ize" the seller. Whether a true "reimbursement" system could be approved
is at least open to conjecture. In Pittsburgh Corning'3 the Commission
refused to accept the argument that the higher sales price in Germany was
justified by the costly technical assistance given to German customers. In
deciding that those German customers not wanting technical assistance
should not have to bear the financial burden of it,'" the Commission
seemed to be objecting to the fact that the "penalty" imposed on the
Belgian and Dutch distributors selling in Germany was not sufficiently
'1d. 112.
'"Id. 1 114.
"'388 U.S. 365 (1967).
2
'See Bennett, Vertical Territorial Restraints: Do's and Don'ts for the Manufacturer with
Independent Distributors, 32 Bus. LAW. 1771 (July 1977); Hibner, Territorial and Customer
Limitations, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 300 (1975).
"
2
'n the United States, see, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537
F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill.
1970), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 801 (1973); Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assoc., Inc., 353 F.
Supp. 1143 (N.D.Ill. 1972). But see Sharp Elecs. Corp. [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 20,638 (FTC, 1974).
15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 272) 35 (1972); [1970-1972 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 9539.
'"Id. CCH 9539 at 9207.
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correlated to the actual expenses incurred by the German distributor in
cultivating or providing service to the ultimate customer.
In the second Transocean Marine Paint Association decision' 5 a provi-
sion requiring a member to pay a commission to another member was
struck down. However, this commission payment was clearly found to be in
the nature of a penalty intended to discourage sales within the assigned
territory. '26
The Commission decision in General Motors' was marked by a finding
that excessive charges for services relating to an inspection required by the
Belgian Government for all cars imported into Belgium constituted an
abuse of GM's dominant position (Article 86). Specifically, the discourage-
ment of parallel imports through the imposition of excessive charges (in
relation to the actual costs incurred by GM) was found to be abusive. On
appeal, 28 the ECJ agreed with the Commission that
... an abuse might consist, inter alia, in the imposition of a price which is
excessive in relation to the economic value of the service provided, and which has
the effect of curbing parallel imports by neutralizing the possibly more favourable
level of prices applying in other areas in the Community .... 129
The Court overturned the decision, however, on the grounds that the
prices charged were not excessive,'30 thereby suggesting that a reimburse-
ment system in which one can authenticate the correlation between the
profits passed over and the expenses incurred by the distributor whose
customer was pirated will pass muster under Article 85.
The second "indirect territoriality" scheme involves assigning a distribu-
tor an "area of primary responsibility" and terminating him if he does not
adequately promote the sale of or represent the product(s) within his terri-
tory.' 3 ' A "primary responsibility" system may have substantially the same
effect as a territorial restriction, since thorough cultivation of an assigned
area might require most of a distributor's effort. If the policy is enforced by
sales quotas and the threat of franchise loss for inadequate representation in
'17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 19) 18 (1974), 13 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 11 (1974), [1973-1975
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 9628.
'
86See, Re Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n. (1), 10 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 163) 10 (1967);
[1965-1969 Transfer Binderl Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 9188, at 8401.
18 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 29) 14 (1975), [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8320.
12818 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 23) 2 (1975), [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8320, at 7727.
11I1d. CCH 1 8320, at 7735.
11"Id. at 7736.
" In the United States, see, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537
F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976); Reed Bros., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976); United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031
(N.D. Il1. 1970), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 801 (1973); Plastic Packaging Materials, Inc. v. Dow
Chem. Co., 327 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 291 F.
Supp. 564 (N.D. II1. 1968). But cf. Hobart Bros., Co. v. Malcom T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d
894 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973).
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the assigned area, concentration of the dealer's effort becomes more likely
still. The Commission has routinely approved clauses of exactly this type
when imposed on distributors and retailers in the course of selective distri-
bution.' 32
Lastly, one should mention the method used in GTE Sylvania'33 - the
use of location clauses restricting retailers to particular locations,' 34 pos-
sibly with a prohibition against soliciting sales outside a given area, but
without limitation on where sales may occur. Such restrictions appear to be
compatible with the Competition Rules. Article 2(l)(b) Regulation 67/67
explicitly authorizes fixed locations and bans on extraterritorial solicitation
of sales in relation to exclusive dealing agreements."'3 Most of the selective
distribution decisions have approved such conditions in the agreements
between the manufacturer on the one hand and the wholesalers and retailers
on the other.' 6
The attempt to establish a foundation for a per se rule prohibiting abso-
lute territorial limitations suffers further from the exceptions to the general
rule against direct imposition of the same. An agreement could only be per
se illegal under Article 85(3) if it is violative of Article 85(1). Thus the de
minimis "exception"' 37 could cover any sort of scheme to prevent parallel
imports, including a flat prohibition against exports outside of one's terri-
tory.'
38
There is another, more fundamental exception to the rule against territo-
rial protection - that based on the necessity to penetrate new markets. The
"'See, e.g., Junghans, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 30) 10 (1977); SABA, 19 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 28) 19 (1976); Re the Application of BMW AG, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 29)
1 (1975). Typical of the restrictions imposed upon retailers are those used by BMW: (1) "to
endeavor, within the territory covered by the agreement, to sell at least such quantity of the
goods covered by the agreement as is specified by BMW on the basis of an estimate of demand
and sales potential in the territory and of after-service potential; and further to place his orders
monthly and give an estimate of his requirements for the following months;" (2) "not to
operate branches or distribution depots or use intermediaries outside his own territory, nor to
advertise or canvass in any other way, outside his territory, unless the principal obligation
under the agreement is fulfilled, namely the diligent promotion of sales and after-sales service
within his territory.
1"433 U.S. 36 (1977).
"'in the United States see, e.g., Boro Hall Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2nd
Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943); Salco Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., Buick Motor
Div., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975); Kaiser v. Gen. Motors Corp., Pontiac Motor Div., 396
F.Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
'"Art. 2(l)(b):
Apart from an obligation falling within Article I, no restriction on competition shall be
imposed on the exclusive dealer other than:
(a) ....
(b) the obligation to refrain, outside the territory covered by the contract, from seeking
customers for the goods to which the contract relates, from establishing any branch,
or from maintaining any distribution depot.
"'See, e.g., cases cited note 132 supra.
"'See 11 B, supra.
"'This was exactly the type of restriction approved in V61k v. Vervaecke, [1969] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 295.
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basis for this contention can be found in the judgment of the Court of
Justice in the L. T.M. case:
In particular the alteration of the conditions of competition may be thrown in
doubt if the said agreement appears precisely necessary for the penetration of an
undertaking into an area in which it was not operating.'"
Soon after that case, the Commission applied the exception to the com-
mission payment system utilized in Transocean Marine Paint Association
(I). ' ° While the commission payments were found to have as their main
object the discouragement of extraterritorial sales (and thus indirect territo-
rial insulation), they were exempted under Article 85(3) as necessary to
enable the members of the association, most of whom were small or
medium-sized enterprises, to establish themselves and their product in the
relevant market.
On at least two subsequent occasions, the Commission explicitly referred
to a temporary authorization of absolute territorial protection to enable a
new producer to break into the market."' As well, in the AOIP/Beyrard
decision,42 the Commission was faced with an application for an exemption
of a patent licensing agreement containing provisions that:
the licensee could not export to countries where the licensor had granted licenses
or assigned his patents to other firms [export ban];
the licensor could not issue a manufacturing or sales license to any other licensee
in the licensee's country [exclusivity].
The Commission was of the opinion that both of these provisions could
qualify for exemption if, in the case of the former,', 3 it provided the licensee
with an incentive to penetrate a geographic or product market not yet
entered by the licensor or, in the case of the latter, it temporarily protected
the licensee against the licensor or other licensees, when this is necessary in
order to reduce the risk inherent in initial investments on a new market.'I"
Lastly, in the Distillers decision,' 45 the Commission rejected the at-
tempted indirect territorial exclusivity at least in part because "DCL spirits
are not new products [in] need [of] introduction for which extraordinary
promotional efforts are required."'4 6
"'11966] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 235, 250.
"110. J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 163) 16 (1967).
"'in Parfums Marcel Rockas GmbH v. Bitsch, [1970] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 515, one of the
submissions of the Commission specified: "It is not inconceivable that export prohibitions
could be authorized under Article 85(3), if, for example, an exclusive dealer were to incur
extraordinarily high costs in order to introduce a particular product on the market."
See also COMMISSION OF THE EC, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 58 (1972).
"19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 6) 8 (1976).
"'In two earlier cases, exclusive manufacturing licenses were exempted because they assured
the licensees of an adequate return on their investment. Re Raymond's Agreement, 15 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 143) 31 (1972); Kabetmetal, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 222) 34 (1975).
1'4COMMISSION OF THE EC, FIFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 54 (1976).
"'21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 50) 16 (1978).
"1d. 1l2.
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From the above survey of the law in the area, it appears that, for the
present, it is not possible to talk of per se rules existing in the EEC. The
exceptions to the prohibition against absolute territorial restrictions, even in
the face of widespread "philosopical" contempt for the latter, are too
numerous to prove the rule. Rather, they refute it.
IV. The Remaining Contours of Competition Law
in the Distribution Area
A. Selective Distribution
It has been detailed above' 7 that the selection or appointment of retail
dealers will not violate Article 85(1) when based on objective qualitative
standards which ensure the suitability of the distribution network to the
nature of the product. While the cases thus far have been limited to the
motor vehicle, watch and clock, consumer electronics (and, perhaps, luxury
goods) industries, the general rule can be clearly discerned.
There are two other types of distribution agreement conditions which
have been analyzed and approved under Article 85(3) - those restricting
dealer status to persons willing to perform "supplementary duties" in rela-
tion to the product(s); and those limiting the absolute number of dealers,
either on general considerations or case by case, on grounds of business
policy. Under the "supplementary obligations" heading, restrictions on
competition resulting from sales promotion, non-competition, customer
limitation and minimum sales clauses have all benefited from Article 85(3)
treatment. The standards for qualification as a retail dealer used in BMW
serve to illustrate this point. In that decision the Commission approved
requirements that dealers adhere to sales targets, make monthly advance
purchases of inventory, establish a service department satisfactory to the
manufacturer, participate in the BMW guarantee program, stock a com-
plete line of parts and goods, not carry goods of competing manufacturers,
not sell to unauthorized dealers or customers reserved to BMW, not estab-
lish branches or depots outside the assigned territory and not advertise or
canvass sales outside the territory unless the primary sales targets had been
satisfied. 48
While it is incautious to generalize, given the relatively few decisions in
this area and the fact that each Article 85(3) exemption turns on its own
unique facts, the strain that appears to run through the selective distribution
cases is that the Commission will allow those supplementary dealer qualifi-
cations which it deems to be reasonable in light of the nature of the product
and whose absence would seriously frustrate the legitimate objectives of the
distribution system under review. Conversely, those dealer obligations
which are merely incidental to the proposed distribution scheme (e.g.,
1'See Part II-D supra.
"1CCH 9701 at pp. 9539-9, 9539-10, 9539-1 I.
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where the desired end could be achieved by other means) and whose purpose
appears to be directed at facilitating anti-competitive behavior will not be
tolerated.
The acceptability of the second category of distribution agreement condi-
tions - limits on the number of entrants to a distribution system - de-
pends, in the Commission's view, on whether the product in question "is of
such a kind (by reason of its technical complexity, need for high-quality
after-sales service or inherent risks) that there must be close cooperation
between manufacturer and dealer of an order that no other distribution
[structure] could adequately secure."' 49 In the two decisions which consid-
ered quantitative restrictions,' 0 the controlling factor appears to have been
the need to ensure each dealer a return sufficient to warrant his investment
in setting up the necessary sales and service infrastructure. That the Com-
mission is cognizant of the apparent flaws and inconsistencies in this ratio-
nale as a basis for an Article 85(3) exemption is demonstrated by its present
reluctance and probable further refusal to extend the approval originally
granted in Omega to such restrictions.'"' It is suggested that in drafting
distribution agreements one should carefully consider whether it is still
worthwhile to seek an exemption for quantitative limitations. In this
writer's opinion it is not.
In sum, the present state of selective distribution law can be said to
provide that, with the above detailed qualifications, a manufacturer of
technically complex goods requiring specialized sales treatment, can refuse
to sell to those wholesalers and retailers who are incapable of providing
satisfactory product service and of complying with the manufacturer's com-
mercially constructed scheme for distribution.
B. Exclusive Distribution and Revised
Regulation 67/67
Exclusive dealing means that a seller of goods has appointed a sole dis-
tributor for a territory with the promise that the seller will not supply any
other dealer in that territory. The agreement is sometimes limited in time
and is frequently reciprocal - the seller agrees to make sales only to the
dealer in each territory (thus excluding the possibility of direct sales to the
consumer), and the dealer agrees not to accept supplies of any competing
product for the duration of the contract. Some agreements may require the
dealer to purchase "tied" merchandise or refrain from selling outside the
"'COMMISSION OF THE EC, FIFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 24 (1976).
'
9Omega, 13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 272) 35 (1972) and BMW, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 29) 1 (1975). Quantitative restrictions were also approved in the perfume industry press
releases. However, these "decisions" were taken under Article 85(1) and involved unique
analysis. See Part II D supra.
'This view is based upon discussions with the relevant Commission staff during the course
of this writer's employment in the Competition Directorate.
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contract territory, and may allow the seller to reserve certain customers
within the territory for himself.' 52
Many of the agreements which the Commission has been called upon to
scrutinize have involved exclusive distribution arrangements for part or all
of the Common Market. Given the number of cases of this type presented,
the Council of Ministers by Regulation No. 19/65' 3 authorized the Com-
mission to issue a "block exemption" for exclusive distribution agreements,
exclusive purchase agreements, and exclusive purchase and sale agreements
which met certain requirements.
Pursuant to this authorization, the Commission issued Regulation No.
67/67 of March 22, 1967.' 5' For the categories of agreements specified,
insofar as the agreements contained no restrictive provisions other than
those permitted by Article 2 of the Regulation, and insofar as the Regula-
tion was not rendered inapplicable by the terms of its own Article 3, an
automatic exemption under Article 85(3) of the Treaty was granted without
any need to register the agreement with the Commission. (Distribution
agreements violative of Article 85(1) which do not qualify for the group
exemption must be notified, pursuant to Article 4(1) of Council Regulation
No. 17,' in order to obtain an exemption under Article 85(3) of the
Treaty.)
The block exemption is presently effective through December 31, 1982,36
but in the Sixth Report on Competition Policy,'" the Commission an-
nounced its intention to propose amendments to a number of the articles of
Regulation 67/67 "to bring them into line with developments in Commu-
nity law, particularly as expounded by the Court of Justice.' '5. The final
draft of the revised Regulation 67/67 contains certain changes which are of
major importance and which will reduce the scope of the exemption, pre-
sumably resulting in a large number of notifications seeking case-by-case
exemption.
The situation is not really analogous to the United States Department of
Justice's Merger Guidelines' 9 nor to the Federal Trade Commission's en-
'"See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
"'18 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 36) 533 (1965).
"1110 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 57) 849 (1967), amended by Regulation No. 2591/72, 15 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 276) 7 (1972).
'5 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. 13) 204 (1962).
'6Regulation No. 67/67, article 1.
"'Addendum to the TENTH GENERAL REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMUNITIES
(Brussels 1977). The Commission annually publishes such a report and in it gives its views
regarding most matters affecting competition policy which occurred during the previous year.
'"ld. at 19.
"'In 1968, the Justice Department issued guidelines outlining its standards for determining
whether to oppose corporate mergers - vertical, horizontal and conglomerate. [19741 1 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 4510.
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forcement guides.' 6° The American guidelines are useful mainly in delineat-
ing the extent to which the relevant government authority will condone, by
not taking action against, activities falling within their parameters. The
Department of Justice's right to commence proceedings against a firm not-
withstanding the firm's compliance with the guidelines is expressly reserved,
and while the guidelines are somewhat persuasive to courts adjudicating
private lawsuits, they are not binding upon them. 6 '
The closest approximation of the American guidelines would be commis-
sion notices'62 which attempt to clarify or expound upon the law in certain
areas without prejudice to the Commission or the ECJ acting dissonantly
with their contents. Unfortunately, their reliability as a guide to conduct is
very low, decreasing proportionately with their respective ages.
Commission Regulations,' 63 however, are different. They are of legisla-
tive weight and importance. While it is true that in the area of group
exemptions, the Commission (being the only entity empowered to apply
85(3)) basically states the circumstances in which it can be considered to
have acted affirmatively (which is very similar to the Department of
Justice's detailing the circumstances in which it will not take action), and
reserves the right to act notwithstanding formal compliance,' 64 two impor-
tant differences remain.
The Regulation is binding in its application on both the ECJ and national
courts. If an activity falls within the terms of Regulation 67/67, no court
can find an actionable Article 85(1) violation. Even if the Commission,
pursuant to its authority under Article 7, decides to remove the benefits of
'6See, e.g., FTC, Enforcement Policy with Respect to Vertical Mergers in the Cement
Industry (1967), [1973] I TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4520; FTC, Enforcement Policy with
Respect to Mergers in the Food Distribution Industries (1967), [1973] 1 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 4525; FTC, Enforcement Policy with Respect to Product Extension Mergers in
Grocery Products Manufacturing (1968), [19731 I TRADE REG. REP. 4530; FTC, Guides for
Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services, 16 C.F.R. § 240
(1978).
'""[The guidelines are] entitled to some consideration particularly when elements of the
guidelines find support in the developing case law." Allis-Chambers Mfg. Co. v. While Con-
sol. Indus., 414 F.2d 506, 524 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970).
'"2There have been four notices altogether: Notice on Exclusive Agency Contracts Made with
Commercial Agents, 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2921 (1962); Notice on Patent License Agreements, 5
J.O. COMM. EUR. 2922 (1962); Notice Concerning Agreements, Decisions, and Concerted
Practices in the Field of Cooperation Between Enterprises, II J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. C 64) 1
(1968). This last notice is in the process of being revised by the Commission. A notice concern-
ing subcontracting agreements is currently being prepared.
'1n addition to Regulation 67/67, the Commission has issued Regulation 2743/T2, grant-
ing a group exemption to categories of specialization agreements. 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
291) 23 (1972). Both regulations were issued pursuant to a delegation of authority by a Council
of Ministers Regulation. (Regulation 19/65, 8 J.O. COMM. EUR. 533 (1965); and Regulation
2821/71, 14 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 285) 46 (1971).
'"See Article 7 of Regulation 67/67 and Article 5 of Regulation 2988/74.
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Article 85(3) exemption from agreements otherwise qualifying under the
terms of the Regulation, it may not do so with retroactive effect. Accord-
ingly, if one complies with the Regulation, one has an absolute defense to
charges arising from Article 85(1) violations until informed to the contrary
by the Commission.
Secondly, there is the difference occasioned by the scope of the Regula-
tion and the basically administrative nature of EEC law. In contrast to the
important judicial role played in the development of American antitrust
law, European competition law is almost exclusively the product of the
Commission and the ECJ. Furthermore, up to the present time, one can
fairly say the Commission has supplied much more of the "meat" on
Article 85's bones than has the court.
One obvious result is the much greater degree of influence over antitrust
law wielded by the Commission compared with the Justice Department. It is
in this context that the importance of the group exemption should be con-
sidered. The Commission has used the legislative power delegated by the
Council of Ministers to carve out the contours of large areas of substantive
EEC law. Exclusive distribution agreements in the EEC are constructed in
accordance with Regulation 67/67. The same will be true of patent licensing
when (if?) the proposed regulation governing it (prepared by the Commis-
sion) is brought into force. The extensive (and certainly in the latter in-
stance, ambitious) scope of such regulations, albeit enhanced by their quasi-
legislative force, can be appreciated by contemplating the legality of an
exclusive distribution arrangement in California set up using all the avail-
able clauses of Regulation 67/67. Without knowledge of the client or the
product, could one write an opinion specifically detailing which clauses are
permissible?
Some comments upon the salient features, present and proposed, of this
system are in order. Article 1(1)165 defines the types of bilateral agreements
and concerted practices which may enjoy an exemption under the Regula-
tion. The article contains no reservation as to the origin of the products or
the place of establishment of the parties concerned: thus an agreement
whereby a supplier established outside the Common Market grants an ex-
clusive distributorship to a dealer inside the Common Market can also
benefit from the group exemption.
"'Article I (1) provides:
Pursuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty and subject to the provisions of this regulation it
is hereby declared that until December 31, 1982, Article 85(l) of the Treaty shall not apply
to agreements to which only two undertakings are party and whereby:
(a) one party agrees with the other to supply only to that other certain goods for resale
within a defined area of the common market; or
(b) one party agrees with the other to purchase only from that other certain goods for
resale; or
(c) the two undertakings have entered into obligations, as in (a) and (b) above, with
each other in respect of exclusive supply and purchase for resale.
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Article 1(2) in its present form provides that the Regulation shall not
apply where only undertakings from one member state are involved. How-
ever, the Court of Justice in its decision in Foundaries Roubaix Wattrelos'"
and Concordia'6 7 has held that exclusive agreements of this type qualify for
the block exemption (even considering that they will only occasionally have
the requisite appreciable effect on trade between member states necessary to
trigger Article 85(1)) provided they also satisfy all the conditions set out in
Article 1(1). Accordingly, in the revised Regulation the Commission pro-
poses to delete Article 1(1) in order to conform with those two judgments.
Article 2 '68 lists the types of restrictive clauses that may be contained in
the exclusive dealing agreement.These may be categorized as non-
competition clauses (Article 2(1)) and sales promotion clauses (Article 2(2)).
At least two authors'69 are of the opinion that a strict application of Article
2(l)(b) in an integrated distribution system could result in absolute territo-
rial protection and consequent partitioning of the market. In their view,
permitting suppliers to require distributors not to solicit clients outside the
assigned sales territory would obviate the chances of successfully selling
outside the allocated area. Conversely, it is worth noting that the Commis-
sion, in its Omega decision,' 70 indicated that it would interpret Article 2
restrictively:
Regulation 67/67, however, is applicable only where the agreements in question
do not impose on the distributors any restrictions of competition other than those
authorized in that Regulation. In the instant case the obligation imposed by
1611976] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. Ill.
'6 7De Norre v. NV Brouwern Concordia, 19 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 378 (1977).
'"Article 2 provides:
1. Apart from an obligation falling within Article I, no restriction on competition shall be
imposed on the exclusive dealer other than:
(a) the obligation not to manufacture or distribute, during the duration of the contract
or until one year after its expiration, goods which compete with the goods to which the
contract relates;
(b) the obligation to refrain, outside the territory covered by the contract, from seeking
customers for the goods to which the contract relates, from establishing any branch, or
from maintaining any distribution depot.
2. Article 1 (1) shall apply notwithstanding that the exclusive dealer undertakes all or any
of the following obligations:
(a) to purchase complete ranges of goods or minimum quantities;
(b) to sell the goods to which the contract relates under trade marks or packed and
presented as specified by the manufacturer;
(c) to take measures for promotion of sales, in particular
to advertise,
to maintain a sales network or stock of goods,
to provide after-sale and guarantee services,
to employ staff having specialized or technical training.
" D. Gijlstra & D. Murphy, Distribution Systems and EEC Law: The Law as It Stands, in
LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 81 (1976).
"113 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. L 242) 22 (1970).
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Omega, on each of its general representatives, to limit the number of enterprises
that are approved as retailers of Omega watches in the territory allocated to it is
not among the restrictions of competition authorised by Article 2 paragraph I of
Regulation 67/67."'
Article 3 '72 presently withholds the benefits of the group exemption from
two categories of agreements - reciprocal exclusive dealing agreements and
agreements whereby it is made difficult for middlemen and consumers to
obtain the goods from persons other than the exclusive dealer.
An amendment will be made to Article 3(a) to provide that an exclusive
distribution arrangement between actual or potential competitors is not
eligible for the block exemption. More (or most) importantly, two new
sub-paragraphs, (c) and (d), are to be added to state that the automatic
group exemption is not applicable:
1. if the population of the territory covered by the contract exceeds
100,000,000 (unless at least two other EEC sources for the goods at the
same level in the distribution chain are available), or
2. if goods sold by a manufacturer under exclusive purchasing agree-
ments with one or more dealers represent "in a substantial part of the
Common Market" more than fifteen percent of the sales of such
goods in the relevant market.
The first new paragraph is to implement the Commission's expressed
intention that exclusive dealing agreements covering all or virtually all of
the Common Market should not be given an automatic exemption. It has,
up until now, been quite common for agreements to define the alloted
territory as, for example, "the Common Market except the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg," a circumvention that was nevertheless within the four cor-
ners of the Regulation. The effect of the change is to remove the group
exemption from agreements covering any two of the large member states -
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.'
"Id. at 22.
"'Article 3:
Article 1 (I) of this Regulation shall not apply where
(a) manufacturers of competing goods entrust each other with exclusive dealing in
those goods;
(b) the contracting parties make it difficult for intermediaries or consumers to obtain
the goods to which the contract relates from other dealers within the common market, in
particular where the contracting parties:
(1) exercise industrial property rights to prevent dealers or consumers from obtaining
from other parts of the common market or from selling in the territory covered by the
contract goods to which the contract relates which are properly marked or otherwise
properly placed on the market;
(2) exercise other rights or take other measures to prevent dealers or consumers from
obtaining from elsewhere goods to which the contract relates or from selling them in the
territory covered by the contract.
"'Populations (as of mid-1975) of the countries of the EEC: Belgium 9,796,000; Denmark
5,059,000; France 52,913,000; West Germany 61,832,000; Ireland 3,127,000; Italy 55, 810,000;
Luxembourg 357,000; Netherlands 13,653,000; United Kingdom 55,962,000. (Source: THE
ECONOMIST 1978).
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The second new paragraph is intended to remove the benefit of automatic
exemption from certain manufacturers possessing substantial shares in the
relevant market for the goods concerned. The Commission felt that in order
to keep better control of the development of distribution systems in the
EEC, it would be best to require such manufacturers to notify their pro-
posed agreements. '74 Unfortunately, the present form of the second sub-
paragraph is ambiguous. Does it bar the benefits of Regulation 67/67 only
within that part of the Common Market where the fifteen percent threshold
is exceeded, or is one excluded from the purview of the Regulation for the
whole of the EEC once the requisite market share is obtained in any sub-
stantial part? The latter interpretation would mean that an Italian shoe
manufacturer holding twenty percent of the Italian market (and no market
share outside of Italy) could not benefit from the group exemption when he
attempts to enter the market in Belgium. It is suggested that the former
interpretation, although involving the potentially difficult process of deter-
mining the exact area in which the fifteen percent limit is exceeded, is more
appropriate to the rationale underlying the Regulation. '7 5
Under the present text of Article 676 of Regulation 67/67, the Commis-
sion has the right to examine otherwise qualifying cases in order to deter-
mine whether to allow an exemption. A modification to Article 6(b) will
make the automatic exemption unavailable for agreements which make it
"unduly difficult" for other manufacturers to sell their products in the
distributorship territory. The present text contains a "not possible" to sell
standard. Finally, Article 6(c)(1), concerning refusal to sell without objec-
tively valid reasons, will also be changed by deletion of the words "in the
territory covered by the contract." In effect, this deletion will mean that if
confronted with an order from a neighboring member state to purchase
goods, absent valid objective reasons the distributor may not refuse to sell
to purchasers who cannot obtain supplies elsewhere on suitable terms. For-
"'Note that falling without the confines of Regulation 67/67 does not preclude the granting
of an individual exemption under Article 85(3). It does, however, require notification of the
agreement pursuant to Art. 4(l) of Regulation No. 17.
"'See Reg. 67/67, recitals.
"'Article 6:
The Commission shall examine whether Article 7 of Regulation No. 19/65/EEC applies in
individual cases, in particular when there are grounds for believing that:
(a) the goods to which the contract relates are not subject, in the territory covered by
the contract, to competition from goods considered by the consumer as similar goods in
view of their properties, price and intended use;
(b) it is not possible for other manufacturers to sell, in the territory covered by the
contract, similar goods at the same stage of distribution as that of the exclusive dealer;
(c) the exclusive dealer has abused the exemption:
(I) by refusing, without objectively valid reasons, to supply in the territory covered by
the contract categories of purchasers who cannot obtain supplies elsewhere, on suitable
terms, of the goods to which the contract relates;
(2) by selling the goods to which the contract relates at excessive prices.
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merly, this limitation applied only to supplies within the territory covered
by the contract.
In short, the changes proposed by the most recent text of amendments to
Regulation 67/67 are such as to limit the availability of the automatic
exemption under Regulation 67/67, and will necessitate a review of existing
agreements in order to determine whether they are in fact exempt. This
review will be imperative, as under existing case law in the EEC most
exclusive distribution agreements would be held to infringe Article 85(1).
Presumably, some transitional arrangement will be made for existing
agreements which do not meet the new terms of Regulation 67/67 so that
they may be registered. By the terms of Article 7(2) of the original Regula-
tion 67/67, companies were given a period of five months after the effective
date of the regulation to register existing agreements. The present draft of
the new terms of the regulation does not contain a provision for a similar
transitional period.
V. Conclusion
This view of EEC distribution law has been through the lens of American
antitrust concepts. This was done in part to provide a framework for con-
trasting and comparing the approach followed by the two systems, in part
to provide to those more familiar with one of the two legal systems a
common touchstone to better understand the other and in part to establish a
point of departure for critically examining the current and projected state of
the relevant law in the Community.
The discussion of the "per se" and "rule of reason" concepts in the
context of EEC competition law led to some general conclusions. In regard
to Article 85(1), both the de jure and the de facto existence of per se rules
was denied. The former was dismissed by the ECJ in the L. T.M. v. M.B. U.
case; the latter was undermined by the de minimis and agency doctrines,
and interred by the "rule of reason" approach developed in the selective
distribution decisions.
With respect to Article 85(3), contract clauses attempting to provide ab-
solute territorial protection were examined as a frame of reference for
testing the per se/rule of reason hypothesis. While the indirect and direct
exceptions to the prohibition of such territorial restrictions refute the
present possibility of a "per se" rule of law, the forcefulness with which the
prohibition is applied and the difficulty of the standards which must be met
to avoid the prohibition serve as a de facto ban on geographical market
divisions.
The prime motivation for this paper is the belief that there is a great deal
of intellectual benefit in the comparative study of the antitrust law develop-
ments in the United States and Europe. While the exact nature of their
respective legal regimes is determined by elements uniquely American or
European, both share a common and fundamental concern for the preser-
vation of a fair and competitive market system.

